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Service Pricing Decision in Cyber-Physical 
Systems: Insights from Game Theory 
Xiao Liu, Mianxiong Dong, Kaoru Ota, Patrick Hung, and Anfeng Liu 
Abstract—In Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Service Organizers (SOs) aim to collect service from service entities at lower 
price and provide better combined services to users. However, each entity receives payoffs when providing services, which 
leads to competition between SOs and service entities or within internal service entities. In this paper, we first formulate the 
price competition model of SOs where the SOs dynamically increase and decrease their service prices periodically according to 
the number of collected services from entities. A game based services price decision (GSPD) model which depicts the process 
of price decisions is proposed in this paper. In the GSPD model, entities game with other entities under the rule of "survival of 
the fittest" and calculate payoffs according to their own payoff-matrix, which leads to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium point. 
Numerous experiments demonstrate that the GSPD model can explain the price dynamics in the real world, and also can help 
decision makers a lot under various scenarios.  
Index Terms—Cyber-Physical Systems, game theory, price decision, cooperation rates   
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
yber-Physical Systems (CPS), integrate a vast variety 
of static and mobile resources, including computing 
devices [1], crowd sensing networks, sensor/actuator 
networks [2], and so on, it has better performance than 
the capabilities of existing systems. In CPS, each device 
can sense and collect information from the surrounding 
environment and provide services through exchanging 
information, those services are called communication 
services (CS) [3]. Generally, devices which directly sense 
information from the surrounding environment are 
called Cyber-Physical Systems entities (called service 
entities or entities). For example, the crowd sensing 
networks (CSNs), which leverage the ubiquity of sensor-
equipped mobile devices to collect information and 
provide a new paradigm for solving the complex sensing 
applications from the significant demands of people’s 
lives [4]. the CPS Organizers (SO) collect some 
services(referred to as the simple Service, SS) from 
entities, then composite these services and provide the 
public (or user) with a higher level of combined services 
(CoS), such as VTrack [5] for providing omnipresent 
traffic information and NoiseTube [6] for making noise 
maps [6]. 
In CPS, there exist complex interactions among SOs, 
entities and users. Price competition between SOs and 
users was previously studied by Walrand [7]. 
Maximizing profit is the primary concern for SOs, which 
might be achieved by having high price level for users 
and low investment on the infrastructure. On one hand, 
users wish to maximize their utility by consuming high 
QoS with low service price. The main price competition 
models are Cournot and Bertrand competition models [8]. 
In the Cournot model, SOs decide the extent of 
investment on their infrastructure through competing 
with each other. On the other hand, in the Bertrand 
model, SOs engage in price competition to attract more 
subscribers for a given infrastructure capacity. An 
important question for SOs is how much of the network 
capacity should be provisioned and how high the service 
price should be. In summary, these studies mainly focus on 
the pricing decision problems between SOs and users. SOs 
play a decisive role in the price competition through 
increasing and decreasing the price according to their 
investment and payment. Price competition between the 
provider and service consumers first aroused people's 
concern, and there are many related researches on it [9-12]. 
However, this paper is mainly concerned about price 
competition between SOs and entities as well as internal 
entities.  In fact, the two competitions play a vital role in 
the new service model. With the development of the CPS, 
traditional service model and the traditional price 
competition have had a fundamental change. In the 
traditional service model, SOs provide the user with a 
service by investing in a certain infrastructure, all 
provided services in this system belong to the SOs,  and 
the types of services and service ability are limited.  In 
the CPS, services are not only produced by SOs. The 
system can provide better services for users than the 
traditional service model. The service interactions are 
completed by adopting the communication service, 
which enables the ubiquitous CPS entities to play its 
great potential, so as to form a new generation of service 
system model. 
In the CPS, there are price competition relationships 
between SOs and entities. Each SO makes an investment 
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in the collection and organizing services, SOs want to 
receive more service at lower price to improve the 
quality of combined service for the user (or customer) to 
maximize its profit. In general, the more simple service 
(SS) collected by SOs, the better of the quality of 
combined services provided by SOs. For example, when 
VTrack collects traffic information services, the 
incomplete collected traffic information will definitely 
affect the use of the users. On the contrary, the more 
information collected by SOs, the better quality of service 
provided by the VTrack and the more detailed traffic 
information can be received by users. However, it is not 
good for SOs to collect too much information, because 
gathering information require payments, and the quality 
of QoS is difficult to improve by increasing the amount 
of information. The number of received services is 
controlled by adjusting service price dynamically. SOs 
will raise the service price to stimulate entities provide 
more services when the number of collected services is 
little; thereby, in order to obtain maximum profits, when 
the collected services are too much, SOs will reduce the 
price so as to decrease the number of collected services 
and acquisition cost. In general, because the information 
collection comes with a certain price (or services), entities 
want to sell their services at a higher price, and hope to 
buy the services at the lowest price (such as λ ). 
Therefore, there exists an equilibrium points for the 
service price between SOs and Entities. 
Theoretically, finding such equilibrium points is not 
easy. The situation becomes even more complicated 
when competition is among entities. In CPS, entities 
compete not only with SOs, but also with other entities. 
In the CPS, there are two ways for getting the 
information by entities (or simple service, SS). (1) 
through sensing the surrounding environment (i.e. SS); 
(2)through the information interaction among entities, 
for example, in the traffic information service system, if 
the entity A  and the entity B mutually exchange 
information, both entities will respectively get two items 
of information. In Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) [16], 
the entity A and the entity B can game with each other; 
both players help their opponent to relay information 
and also get information from their opponent. The 
entities will obtain payoffs when they sell the 
information (or services) to SOs at calibration price. In 
the reality, the behaviors of each entity are naturally 
selfish, each entity hopes to receive service at the 
minimum cost and receive payoff λ  after submitting to 
SOs. In the CPS, interaction between the two entities can 
be regarded as a game. If the two entities cooperate with 
each other in an interaction, it can be seen as a 
cooperative game. In a cooperative game, entities give 
certain payment to others and get service from others. 
However, entities don’t always cooperate with others in 
a cooperator-defector pair. So the game between the 
entities is very complicated and has a great deal of 
uncertainty in the CPS model. 
The complexity and uncertainty of game between 
entities have effect on price competition, which leads to 
price decision becoming extremely difficult. First of all, 
in the real world, each entity adopts different strategies 
when interacting with different entities; some entities can 
adopt the win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) strategy [11, 13], 
and some entities can adopt the Tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. 
Entities with different strategies play the game with 
others based on the rule of "survival of the fittest". Some 
entities will die because of competition failure in the 
game, and some entities can gain competitive advantage 
in the competition and occupy the dominant position. 
The dynamic game process between the entities makes 
the number of collected services change, which results in 
changing the price and the game situation between 
entities in turn. The game between SOs and entities or 
internal entities forms a complicated system. The price 
competition among entities is rarely seen in the 
traditional service model. To find price equilibrium 
points become extremely complex and difficult in the 
complicated system. 
Researching on the complex price competition rule 
can help the SOs and entities to choose the appropriate 
competition strategy and the optimal price so as to 
occupy the dominant position in the competition. For a 
long time, the researchers want to establish a suitable 
model to describe the complex price competition system. 
The main problems of concern are: for the SOs, (a) the 
pricing problem of SOs. Considering the number of 
services received by SOs isω , for a given network, how 
much the price λ  should be set by SOs when the user 
provides a service? If the price λ  is too high, the more 
services provided, and the more prices need to be paid 
by SOs, therefore the efficiency may be lower. (b) When 
the system is to reach stability, how much are the total 
expected payment and payoff? (c) How is the number of 
services provided by entities with different strategies? 
When SOs are facing the dynamic market, according to 
the different strategies, entities adopting effective pricing 
strategy have the most important significance. 
For entities, the key issue of concern is: (a) the 
pricing problem of entities. Entities’ price refers to the 
payment γ promised to give to the other entities which 
provides the service. SOs offer payment λ  to entities 
when entities report services to SOs. The price λ  is 
relatively stable in a short period of time; the entity 
obtains little payoff if the service price γ  of the entity is 
too high, which can cause death to the entity. While the 
service price γ of the entity is too low, other entities have 
no desire to interact with them, which leads to the entity 
being at a disadvantage to competition. Thus, setting a 
reasonable price is the first condition of ensuring an 
entity’s survival. (b) In the game of entities, whether the 
lower service price or the higher price is better for 
entities? Which price competition is the dominant factor 
in the game? (c) Whether the service price of entities with 
different strategies will finally reach the same state in the 
evolution of the game? (d) What kind of strategy should 
be adopted in the game to make an entity win in the 
competition? 
Although there are a lot of studies on price 
competition model [9-11], most of the researches are 
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mainly aimed at the price competition pattern between 
service providers and service Consumers (Service 
Provider VS Services Consumers, SP-SC). A game based 
services price decision (GSPD) model is proposed to 
depict price competition phenomenon of the CPS on the 
principles of game theory in economics. The main 
contributions of our work in this paper are as follows: 
 (1) A game based services price decision (GSPD) 
model is proposed to depict price competition in Service 
Organizer VS CPS Entities (SO-E) and Entities VS Entities 
(E-E). In the GSPD model, each entity has its own payoff 
matrix, increasing the payoff can stimulate entities to 
game in order to get more payoffs. Entities will also 
reduce the number of game when reducing the payoffs of 
entities; this is consistent with the characteristics of the 
CPS. The entity is glad to provide more services if the 
entity obtains more payment in the game. On the 
contrary, the entity will weaken its participation degree if 
the entity obtains negative payoffs in the process. The 
GSPD model reflects the actual situation of CPS. In the 
GSPD model, the entity will reduce the service price if 
the total payoffs of the entity grow in the process of game. 
SOs control the number of received services within the 
scope of the intended target through adjusting the price 
unit. The results of theory and experiments show that the 
proposed GSPD model can dynamically depict the price 
competition process of SO-E as well as E-E. The GSPD 
model can also reach the equilibrium points for the 
service price of SOs and entities at initial price, the 
number of entities, and the number of services. 
 (2) The issues which the manager concerned can be 
answered through the GSPD model. For the manager, 
they can get the optimized price λ  before they put their 
service into market through the proposed GSPD model; 
payoff and payment can be predicted under the price λ . 
The income contributions to the system of population 
with different strategies can get. Optimize the price λ , 
payment and payoff by investigating the distribution and 
density of population and the frequency of the game, 
such as network structure, which provides valuable 
decision-making support for managers. For the Entity, 
GSPD model can give the service price γ  of an entity 
with different strategies and what strategies can make an 
entity obtain more payoffs in competition. The GSPD 
model can also reveal that the service price γ of entities 
with different strategies will not be equal, and the 
entities with the lowest price γ  are not always the 
biggest payoff. And the biggest payoffs of entity are not 
necessarily the lowest price γ . 
 (3) Through our extensive simulation study, we 
demonstrate that the GSPD model can reach equilibrium 
points for the service price in various network 
parameters and under different network structure. The 
change of system payoffs in different network structure 
and the price of different network parameters of the 
system will be given, which help the manager and the 
entity to obtain the optimal price. Through the analysis 
of a large numbers of experimental results, it 
demonstrates that the GSPD model is more suitable to 
reflect the services pricing competition phenomenon in 
CPS, which contributes to the theoretical development of 
literature. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2, the related works are reviewed. The system 
model is described in Section 3. In Section 4, a game 
based services price decision (GSPD) model for services 
price decision in CPS is presented. Section 5 is 
experimental results and comparison. We conclude in 
Section 6. 
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Many competitive models have been used to describe 
price competition between the user and SOs, and SOs 
and entities. The relevant researches can be seen in the 
Ref. [3, 9-12]. The Stackelberg game is a strategy which 
describes the game between the user and SOs [17]. The 
Stackelberg game consists of two stages. In the first phase, 
different SOs declare the price strategy p, and tell the 
price to all users. Users formulate their own service 
consumption plan q according to the received pricing 
strategy p. After determining the price strategy, there are 
non-cooperative game problem about competition for 
network resources; Nash equilibrium is a game method 
to solve this problem. In the second phase, SOs adjust 
their prices to further obtain the optimal utility after SOs 
get the strategy of service consumption of the user. 
The price war in communication service is observed in 
Ref. [3, 18]. In such scene, if SOs reduces its price to 
increase revenue or to monopolize the entire market, 
then the other operators will also reduce their price or 
increase the capacity of the network to match the price 
leader, the reason is that network capacity is directly 
related to the QoS of users.  However, lower price and 
higher QoS under the same price level have great effect 
on users. The price down competition will occur 
repeatedly among all SOs, eventually every SO’s revenue 
will decrease and reach a new equilibrium [3].  
The above price competition game can't describe the 
game relationship among entities. When John Maynard 
and George R Price proposed that use the method of the 
“strategy” and mathematics to predict the biological 
group competition phenomenon in 1973, Evolutionary 
game theory were originated [19]. Evolutionary game 
theory is different from the classical game theory which 
is to highlight change dynamics of the strategy–it 
influences the balance of the whole system not only 
through the quantity of the strategy, but also through the 
density or frequency of the different strategies in the 
population [20]. Evolutionary game theory is important 
to explain lots of complex challenges in biological 
systems. The rule of "Survival of the fittest" is the basic 
laws of evolutionary game. The payoffs in the game 
theory are converted to fitness in the evolutionary game 
(fitness) [20]. It is different from the classical game theory, 
one important part of evolutionary game theory is 
replicator dynamics [20]; this rule mainly describes how 
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to reproduce the next generation of individuals with high 
fitness in the competition group, while the individual 
with low fitness will die from the group. 
In Ref. [20], we show that it is not always true that 
remembering history for the entity can promote currency 
in evolutionary games. The participant can remember the 
last game history (that is, 1-step memory), it is enough 
for games. So this work adopts the 1-step memory 
mechanism to code the game history and strategy [20]. In 
the 1-step memory, all entities only remember the last 
game history. Cooperative is coded into "1" and defection 
is coded into "0", There are totally 4 types of historical 
interactions with 1-step memory: 00 (the sponsor player 
defects and the opponent defects), 01 (the sponsor player 
defects and the opponent cooperates), 10 (the sponsor 
player cooperates and the opponent defects), 11 (the 
sponsor player cooperates and the opponent cooperates). 
Though this work can not directly apply in the GSPD 
model，it gives us some deep thought for game model. 
3 THE SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
3.1. System model 
The adopt system model in this paper is similar to Ref. 
[3]. We use Fig. 1 to illustrate a Cyber-Physical Systems 
(CPS). The system consists of three parts：(a) Users i.e. 
consumers. Users get provided services by giving 
corresponding payment to SOs. (b) Service Organizers 
(SOs) collect simple services (SS) from entities and obtain 
payoffs by providing more comprehensive and better 
services to users. At the same time, it needs to pay 
corresponding payment to entities which provide simple 
services. (c) N CPS entities, i. e. entities. Entities are 
source gatherer of simple services in the CPS [21-24]. All 
services are come from entities in the SOs. Entities gain 
most of primitive simple services (SS) through sensing 
their surrounding environment. An Entity needs to pay a 
certain cost for collecting SS and obtain payoffs by 
submitting SS to SOs. In addition, Entities can also get 
more SS or benefits through the interaction among 
entities (game). 
There are many researches on price competition 
between the user and SOs. This article mainly focuses on 
the more complex price competition between SOs and 
the entity and among entities.  
The main purpose of SOs is to provide more 
comprehensive and better services to users. But in order 
to collect those simple services, SOs publish some service 
gathering tasks to the area of interest (AoI) for the 
application, for example, traffic information collection 
can be regarded as a simple service gathering task. 
Entities in the AoI receiving the service gathering task 
determine whether to participate in service gathering. If 
an entity decides to conduct the service gathering, it will 
collect services and submit the collected simple services 
to SOs and obtain given payoffs according to the service 
price set by the SOs. At last, the SOs publish their 
available composite services for users and get some 
payoffs from users.  It is same as Ref. [3], we only 
consider one service application in CPSs, which requires 
continuous service gathering (traffic jam alter, 
environmental monitoring and protection such as noise, 
smog/haze detection, citizen-journalism, tourist query, 
etc.) [3].   
 
Fig. 1.  The game based services price decision framework in 
CPS  
There are N entities in the system 1 2 3{ , , ,..., }Ne e e e , 
each entity represents a person or a mobile device. Game 
among entities can be conducted to make their own 
profit maximization, such as environmental monitoring, 
the traffic networks monitoring. After entity 1e  and 
entity  2e  receive the service gathering task from the SOs, 
they sense the surrounding environment and get some 
simple services respectively. If 1e  and 2e gave services to 
each other when entity 1e  games with entity 2e , a 
cooperative game is formed in this way. In this 
situation, 1e  and 2e  not only have its own services, but 
also receive each other’s services. Thus they can report 
more services to their own SOs and obtain more payoffs. 
At the same time, 1e  and 2e  need to pay the payments 
for the received services. In Fig. 1, 1e  requests services 
from 4e , 4e  gives services to 1e , while 1e  doesn’t pay 
corresponding payments to 4e , resulting in 4e  only 
bearing the cost in the game, and 1e  can receive  services 
without any payments, this is the half cooperation game 
where 1e  defects and 4e  cooperates. On the contrary, 1e  
provides services to 3e , but 3e don’t provides promised 
payments to 1e ; that is, 1e  cooperates and 3e  defects. 
Finally, 4e and 5e  don’t provide services with each other, 
so these two entities don’t obtain payoffs in the game.  
The system model can be adopted for many 
applications such as from Machine-to-Machine (M2M) 
communication to Device-to-Device(D2D) 
communication. For example, Device-to-Device (D2D) 
communication refers to a radio technology that enables 
devices to communicate directly with each other [25-26]. 
The terminal users will be able to benefit from the 
number of services in D2D. In the D2D communication, it 
may even allow users to experience benefits in terms of 
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smaller communication latency, increased data rate and 
reduced energy consumption [22, 23, 25-26].  In a Device-
to-Device (D2D) network, each device can be regarded as 
entity which can collect simple services, it can also 
transfer the services from the other entity to a certain 
location under the condition that the payment can be 
given.  If each entity is trusted, the D2D network will run 
smoothly. In such situation, each entity helps the other 
entity relay services and obtains the payoff in 
cooperation with each other. But in the open D2D 
networks, it does not guarantee that every entity is 
credible. Some selfish entities don't want to transfer other 
entity's services and hope other entities to help him 
transfer services. All of above phenomenon can be 
described by using the game based services price 
decision (GSPD) framework in this paper. GSPD model 
encourage entities to collaborate in the game and 
promote the exchange of services, maximize the payoff of 
the entities. Price competition mechanisms are adopted 
in the GSPD model, which lead the entities to be willing 
to cooperate with the other entities in the game and relay 
services, while the others don’t want to play with the 
selfish entities because of the low collaboration ratio. 
This model is designed to make the D2D network run 
smoothly. 
3.2. Game Strategy 
In this paper, we adopt the same game strategy we 
discussed in Ref. [20], as shown in the Table 1. 
Considering the total number of entities is m  in crowd 
sensing network, There are n =16 kinds of different 
game strategy. Each entity adopts one strategy from the 
16 kinds of game strategy. One population refers to the 
entities with the same game strategy. The number of 
entities in the same population is },....,,{ 321 nvvvv , 
1
n
i
i
mν
=
=∑ . The ratio of population reflects the situation of 
different entities adopting different game strategy in real 
life, while the composition and the proportion of entities 
with different strategies are different in different regions, 
and different times. So the real world can be reflected in 
our model. 
Table 1: The coding of 16 strategies  
Game history of 
Two entities 
The next step of the first one 
00(defect, defect) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
01(defect, cooperate) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
10(cooperate, defect) 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
11(cooperate, cooperate) 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
00(defect, defect) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01(defect, cooperate) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
10(cooperate, defect) 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
11(cooperate, cooperate) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3.3. Problem statement 
  In order to provide the composite services with a 
certain Quality of service (QoS) to users, SOs need to 
collect the simple services from entities. SOs attracts 
entities to collect and submit SS by issuing the purchase 
service price. The required numbers of SS eυ  are certain 
in a small period. SOs can provide composite services 
with a certain QoS as long as simple services eυ  are 
collected. The higher the service price λ  of SOs is, the 
more simple services collected by SOs due to the high 
enthusiasm of the entity. In order to make its quantities 
reach to eυ , SOs will reduce the price λ  when the 
number of collected services is bigger than the expected 
value eυ . On the contrary, if the number of simple 
services is below eυ , SOs stimulates entities to take an 
active part in the collection by raising price λ , which 
makes the entity provide more simple services. SO's goal 
is to ensure receives a certain numbers of simple services 
by using the price competition mechanism. In this paper, 
the basic units of time is a fixed service collection cycle, 
the length of time of the cycle is T , if the current time 
is t , the current time belongs to i = t T   time slot. SOs 
expects to collect ( )e iυ simple services in the i th time slot, 
and in the time slot of i , SOs collect ( )iυ  simple services. 
Thus the SO's goal is to make the difference υ∆  between  
( )iυ  and ( )e iυ  is minimize, that is. 
         ( )Min υ∆ = min ( ) ( )e
i t
i iυ υ
∈
−∑                               (1) 
And the total payments need to be paid by SOs are: 
         Μ = ( )( ) i
i t
iυ λ
∈
∑                                                     (2) 
For entities, m  entities can adopt different strategies 
in order to get maximize payoffs after SOs publishes 
service gathering tasks. This situation is complex for 
different entities to choose different game strategies in 
the price competition process [12]. For entities, an entity 
obtains payoffs λ  when it reports services to SO. 
Considering the obtained payoffs ,A jζ of the entity A  
when playing game with others in the thj  game, the 
payments are ,A jϑ . The net benefits in the game are ,A jϖ  
= ,A jζ - ,A jϑ . After n time games, entity A ’s total payoffs 
in a time slot are 
                 ( ),
1
A
n
total
A j
j
qϖ λ ϖ
=
= − +∑                        (3) 
qλ − is the net income when entity A  reports 
services to SOs, q is the cost when entity A senses 
service. The aim of entity A is to maximize
A
totalϖ . 
Considering entity A  plays game with other 
entities with cooperative strategy in the thj  game， 
entity A can get a service. On the contrary, the 
number of services is 0. ,A jυ  represents the number of 
received services of entity A in the thj  game. So the 
cooperation times of entity A after n times games in a 
time slot, that  is, the number of services is 
( ),
1
A
n
total
A j
j
υ υ
=
=∑                                      (4) 
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And the received services are the total services 
received by all entities involved in the service collection 
tasks in a time slot: 
     ( ),
1
X
n
total
X j
X E X E j
υ υ υ
∈ ∈ =
= =∑ ∑∑                            (5) 
where X means an entity, and E  is the set of all 
entities. We can know the purposes of GSPD model are 
( ),
1
 ,  
    
         ( )  
         ( ) min ( ) ( )
x
n
total
X x j
j
e
i t
optimize
Make
Max Max q
Min i i
λ λ
ϖ λ ϖ
υ υ υ
=
∆
∈
= − +
= −



      



∑
∑
 (6) 
SO formulates reasonable price to minimize the 
differenceυ∆ . The entity determines the service price xλ  
to make the price 
x
totalϖ maximization. 
The price decision process of λ  and xλ  are very 
complex through analysis of above researches. Therefore, 
the pricing problem of dynamic evolution of CPS 
equilibrium points has never been studied. The main 
purpose of this paper is to find a game based price 
decision model which can depict the price decision 
process for CPS. For SOs, through GPSD model, once the 
total numbers of services are given, the GSPD model can 
quickly evolve into robust and equilibrium points. Each 
entity dynamically adjusts the price xλ  in order to obtain 
the biggest payoffs. What’s more, the following questions 
can be solved through the GPSD model. For the manager, 
they can predict the service price λ  of SOs as well the 
price xλ of each entity at equilibrium points in advance. 
What kind of population (i. e. the set of entities with 
same strategy entities is called population) will be 
involved in the game, how is the price of different 
population, and different entities in the same population. 
How much payoffs does each entity get?  What's the 
cooperate rate of the system?    
4 GAME BASED PRICE DECISION MODEL   
There are many researches about the price 
competition between the service provider and service 
consumer in Cyber-Physical Systems, while there are few 
researches on service pricing between SOs and entities or 
among entities. The price competition of the SO-E and E-
E become the main way of Cyber Physical Systems. 
Therefore this paper proposes a new model to depict the 
new price competition process of the CPS. 
4.1. Game matrix 
Table 2 shows the payoff matrix of a traditional 2×2 
game [19]. In CPS, the entity A plays game with the 
entity B, where both players obtain λ ϑ−  if they are in 
cooperation with each other, both players obtain 0 if they 
both defect, the cooperator obtains ϑ− , and the defector λ  
is in the cooperator-defector pair 
 
Table 2: The classic game matrix 
 entity B 
 cooperation non- 
cooperation 
entity  A cooperation λ ϑ− , λ ϑ−  ϑ− , λ  
non- 
cooperation 
λ ,   ϑ−  0,  0 
         In the traditional game, the game matrix of each 
entity is the same. But this does not reflect the actual 
situation of the Cyber-Physical Systems. In a real Cyber 
Physical Systems, each entity does not adopt the same 
game matrix when play with another entity, but the best 
game matrix should be make maximum profit. In 
addition, an entity does not give services to other entity 
without any payoff when playing game with others. In a 
classic game matrix, the entity does not obtain payoffs 
when the entity plays game with other entity, but only 
obtains payoffs when the entity reports services to SOs. 
The little payoffs make other entities don’t want to play 
with the entity. It also doesn’t conform to the actual CPS. 
In the GSPD model, a improved game matrix is 
proposed. In the GSPD model, each entity publishes their 
payoff matrix when playing game with others; some 
payoffs can be obtained from the other entity if it reports 
services to the entity.  Entity A can give the price Aζ  to 
another entity which provides services, and the entity A 
will obtain payoff λ  when reporting the services to SOs. 
And the entity A needs to pay the price q , thus server 
price Aζ  of the entity A should meet the following 
relations: 
                   A qλ ζ ς− − ≥   | 0ς ≥                                   (7) 
Only under the condition of 0ς ≥ , the entity can 
obtain payoffs when it receives services. The entity 
always wants to set Aζ  as low as possible, so as to make 
the profits as high as possible. However, in the actual 
market price competition, the low price does not always 
improve the competitiveness of the entity. The entity 
prefers to play game with entity for high price to obtain 
more payoffs. But the low price does not always improve 
the competitiveness of the entity. The higher the price is, 
the lower the income obtained by the entity. In the game, 
if the entity A cooperates and Entity B defects, the entity 
A gives a service to entity B and doesn’t get any payment 
Bζ  from the entity B, which results in the entity A lose 
the price q  and obtain little payoffs. If the entity A 
obtains little payoff ς  in a cooperator game, and loses 
the price q  in a defector game, the payoffs can be lower 
than the payment, which leads to the payoffs are 0 or 
even negative. So it is necessary to set an appropriate 
price for the entity. 
In GSPD model, Aζ  be set: 
Aζ = ( )qλ∂ −                                                   (8) 
      ∂ is a high coefficient in the initial state, the entity 
gradually reduces the value of Aζ in order to gain more 
benefits in the process of the game. The entity's total 
revenue increased with the decrease of price Aζ , that is, 
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the entity can gain competitive advantage when reducing 
the price Aζ , so reduce the price Aζ  until the price 
reaches balance. In the GSPD model, the way of 
calculating the price of an entity is: if the entity obtains 
payoffs respectively are 1itotalϖ − , itotalϖ  in the i - 1 and i   
time slot, the price ζ  of the entity needs to be adjusted 
according to the following function. 
         (.)c = 111 i i
i
total total
total
ϖ ϖ
χ ϖ
− −
+   
 
                                  (9) 
In the equation (9), χ  is the velocity correction of ζ , 
1i i
total totalϖ ϖ −−  means that the difference between the 
payoffs of the current time slot and the payoffs of the 
previous time slot, which is divided into χ parts. The 
less χ , the greater speed of evolution, the bigger χ , the 
speed of evolution is more stable.  
Unlike the previous game matrix, service payoff is 
not fixed when the entity reports services to SOs, it is 
also change as the process of game. Therefore, it also 
needs to reflect the situation in the GSPD model. But the 
price λ is determined by SOs. In our model, we also 
correct the service price λ  in order to make the 
difference small between actual collection service 
quantities and the desired services, 
namely min ( ) ( )e
i t
i iυ υ
∈
−∑ . The total received services are 
( )iυ  in i th time slot. The service prices λ  of SOs need to 
be adjusted according to following function. 
         (.)f = 1 ( ) ( )1
( )
e
e
i i
i
υ υ
υ
− +  Κ 
                        (10) 
In equation (10),Κ  is the velocity correction of λ , 
( ) ( )e i iυ υ−  means the difference between the expected 
received services quantities and the current actual 
received services quantities, which is divided into 
equalΚ parts. This means that it expects to achieve the 
expected service number ( )e iυ  after Κ generations of 
evolution. The lower the value of Κ , the greater the 
speed of evolution, while the bigger Κ , the speed of 
evolution is more stable. We put forward the payoff 
matrix of evolutionary strategy through the above 
analysis, as shown in table 3. 
Table 3: The game matrix of the GSPD model 
 Entity B 
 cooperation non-
cooperation 
Entit
y A 
cooperatio
n 
(.) (.) Af c qλ ζ− − , 
(.) (.) Bf c qλ ζ− −  
q− ,  
(.)f qλ −  
non- 
cooperatio
n 
(.)f qλ − , q−  0,  0 
4.2. Game strategy 
Though game matrix is a model to depict the main 
part of CPS price competition, it also needs to deal with 
the game model in detail to depict the price competition 
process between SO-E, and E-E better in CPS. In practical 
context, the evolution of the system is also related to the 
cooperation ratio as well as the density and frequency of 
different strategies in the population.  
(1) Cooperation ratio: In the real world, the entity 
would be glad to play game with the entity when an 
entity offers high payments and the cooperation ratio is 
also high in interaction. For the entity with relatively low 
payments, the cooperation rate drops when playing 
game with others and the betrayal ratio rises. The GSPD 
model reflects the reality phenomenon, a method 
proposed in the model, that is, to remedy the cooperation 
ratio on the basis of the entity service price ς  in the 
game. Table. 1 gives the 16 kinds of game strategies with 
1-step memory, in the traditional 1-step memory game, 
where the next step is certain according to the strategies 
of table. 1. In the GSPD model, the next step does some 
correction based on the model of our paper, the way is 
that let the entities run the reverse strategy at some 
probabilities. And correct probability is based on the 
degree of Aζ  deviation λ . 
          ϕ = qλ ζε
λ
− − 
 
 
                                                (11) 
(2) The frequency of the game. The frequency of the 
game is the game times of the entity in a generation game 
(in a time slot). Obviously, the entity has little impact on 
the payoffs of the system if it doesn’t participate in the 
game. While the game times of the entity has serious 
effect on the system. The model should encourage those 
behaviors which can promote the system evolution and 
impose restrictions on those behaviors which block 
system evolution. Therefore, in the GSPD model, we 
adopt the following incentive strategy. 
After a round of games, each entity calculates its 
payoffs. If the payoffs are higher than the other entities of 
the system or higher than the average payoffs of its 
neighbors, the system increases the game times to 
promote its evolution in the next generation of game. 
Conversely, if an entity’s payoff is lower than average 
payoffs of the system or below the average payoffs of its 
neighbors in a generation of game, this means that the 
entity is at competitive disadvantage in the competition, 
so the obtained payoffs are lesser. Based on the theory of 
evolution, the game times should be reduced for the 
decrease of payments in the next generation of game. We 
call this way that increases game times of the advantaged 
of population and reduces game times of the 
disadvantaged of population the "winner increases and 
loser decreases" strategy. 
The "winner increases and loser decreases" strategy is 
consistent with the CPS. In CPS, the enthusiasm to 
participate in game can be increased if the payoffs are 
above the average in the process of game, which results 
in gaining more payoffs and becoming more active and 
positive. For that reason, those entities want to increase 
game times to increase their payoffs. And while for those 
entities whose payoffs is less than the average in the 
game, this will reduce the enthusiasm for the game or 
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even cause them don’t involved in the game. Therefore, 
in the GSPD model, 1ig +  in the formula below means the 
game times of entity A in 1i + th generation. 
   
1i
Ag
+
= , , ,
, ,
1
i
i A i i A i AA
i A i A
g
ϖ ϖ ϖ ω
ϖ ϖ
 − −
+ +  
 
             (12) 
1i
Ag
+
 indicates the number of game in the last 
generation of game ( i th generation), 
1i
Ag
+
 means the 
number of game in the next generation of game (( i + 1)th 
generation). ,i Aϖ denotes the payoffs of the entity in the 
i th game,  iϖ = 
total
imϖ said that the average payoffs of 
the system in the i th generation of game, im  means the 
total number of entities in the i th generation of game. 
,i Aω = ( ),
k
i B A
B N
Nϖ
∈
∑ said that the average payoffs of all 
the neighbors of entity k , kN  are the number of 
neighbors of the entity k . 
4.3. Evolutionary strategy 
In the CPS, in order to survive, the entity with 
different strategies constantly adapts to the environment 
in the process of game. So each entity updates their 
strategy with a certain probability in the game. 
Replicator rule is adopted in the GSPD model. Replicator 
rule is also named as proportional imitation rule [24]. 
When a round of games finished, entity A imitates a 
random neighbor B with a probability as described in the 
following equation (13). 
     ( ) ( ) ,  
0,                     
B A B A
A B
B A
P S S
ε ω ω ω ω ω
ω ω
 − >→ = 
≤
      (13)  
AS  and BS  are the strategy of entity A and B, Aω , Bω  
are the accumulated payoffs of the entity A and the 
entity B in a round, ω  is the average payoff in the 
system. ε  means adjustment coefficient.   
 
4.4. The game based services price decision (GSPD) 
algorithm  
In the GPSD model, there are 2 kinds of game, one 
is the game between SOs and entities, and another is the 
game among entities. The main idea of game between 
SOs and entities is: SOs set expected purchase service 
quantity ( )iυ  in i  time slots, and then SOs receive ( )e iυ  
number of services in i  the time, SOs adjusts the 
purchase price λ  based on the difference ( ) ( )e i iυ υ− . 
The algorithm is as follows: 
Algorithm 1: game based services price decision algorithm of SOs 
 
Algorithm 1: service price decision algorithm of SOs 
Input: Predict the number of services ( )iυ to be collected of 
SOs 
Output: the price λ  
1) i =1;                        // i is the generation of game   
4) Do while ( i ≤ Θ & system is unstable) 
  For each SO sπ  Do 
                  Computing   ( )e iυ  after a generation 
                   Set (.)f = 1 ( ) ( )1
( )
e
e
i i
i
υ υ
υ
− +  Κ 
 
                    Set λ = (.)f λ  
          End for 
 5) End Do 
 
The game among entities is more complicated. The 
entity Ae  determines their initial price Aζ  based on 
determined price λ and adjusts the price Aζ  based on 
their earnings on the equation (9). But the difference 
from algorithm 1 is that the game among entities needs 
to adjust the parameters of several other aspects. This 
mainly includes: (a) Cooperation ratio, the entity chooses 
different cooperation ratio based on the equation (11); (b) 
the entity determines the game times according to the 
results of the last game, such as the equation (12). (c) The 
entity is in evolution on the basis of the probability in 
equation (13). This algorithm description is given in the 
form of pseudo code below. 
Algorithm 2: services price decision algorithm of entity 
 
Algorithm 2: Services price decision algorithm of entity  
Input: the price λ   
Output: the price ζ  of entity 
1) i =1;                             // i is the generation of game  
2) Do while ( i ≤ Θ  & system is unstable) 
 For each entity Ae  Do 
    
,A i
totalϖ =0;           //the payoff of entity A is 0          
For ( k =1; k ≤  ; k ++) 
                For ( j =1; 
i
Aj g≤ ; j ++) 
, , , ,A i A i
total total
A i A iqϖ ϖ λ ζ ϑ= + − + −   
                            End for                          
                End for 
                (.)c = , , 1
,
11 A i A i
A i
total total
total
ϖ ϖ
χ ϖ
− −
+   
 
 
                 Aζ = (.) Ac qλ ζ− −     //update price if entity A 
         End for 
         For each entity Ae  Do    //modify game parameters 
         ϕ = qλ ζε
λ
− − 
 
 
   //update the Cooperation ratio  
                      
1i
Ag
+
= , , ,
, ,
1
i
i A i i A i AA
i A i A
g
ϖ ϖ ϖ ω
ϖ ϖ
 − −
+ +  
 
 
 // update the number of the next generation of game 
                      ( )A BP S S→ ;         
 //according to certain probability evolution 
        End for 
5) End Do     
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5 THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND 
ANALYSIS  
5.1. Experimental parameters settings 
The experimental parameters are by default: There 
are 500 entities in this system, λ  = 100, ζ  =100, q  =5. 
Each entity plays game with 9 randomly chosen 
neighbors for 90 times in the beginning of the experiment. 
Calculate the number of received services, if the quantity 
is lower than the expected value, SOs will increase the 
value of λ  to motivate the entity to receive more services. 
Each entity determines their own service price ζ  based 
on their income. The average payoffs are calculated 
according to the payoff matrix when the entity games 
with its’ neighborhood. Each entity calculates the total 
payoffs after rounds of games, and then calculates the 
game times in the next generation of game according to 
their payoffs and the average payoffs of neighbors. If the 
game time is zero, the entity exits the game (or death).  
In this experiment simulation, entities play game 
for 1000 rounds, each entity plays game with the other 
neighbors in each round of experiments, the number of 
game is calculated for the entity after each round of game 
according to their own earnings, each entity modifies the 
payoff matrix and adjusts the game strategy after each 
round of game. 
5.2. The stability of the GPSD model 
The model stability is test firstly under different 
network parameters. Steady state refers to the number of 
entities involved in the game, the cooperation ratio, the 
collected services, and the density of entity with different 
strategies no longer change along with the advance of 
evolution (or a very small change). We can see from Fig. 
2-Fig. 10: the proposed model in this paper can smoothly 
reach the stable state under different network parameters.   
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     Fig. 3 The number of surviving entities 
Fig. 2 shows the case of the number of services 
through the evolution of the system. We can see from Fig. 
2, the overall trend is that the number of services is 
declining with the evolution of the system at first, and 
than the number of services increase slowly. The reason 
is that the payments ζ  is high when an entity receives a 
service at first, the others are glad to play with the entity, 
and the more services can be received by the SOs. But at 
the same time because of the high price ζ , the entity 
obtains low price when reporting the service to SOs. In 
order to increase their income, the entity must decrease 
the priceζ , leading to the other entities unwilling to play 
with the entity with cooperative strategy, so the collected 
services are less. Sometimes, the lower service price may 
have bad effect on the entity. At last, the entity improves 
the service price ζ  to reach the stable state. Fig. 3 reflects 
the case of the surviving entities in the process of the 
evolution of the game, the number of surviving entities is 
declining until it reaches stability. Some entities died due 
to the low total payoffs.  
Fig. 4 reflects the case of the price λ  of SOs in the 
process of evolutionary game. The price λ  is rising until it 
reaches stable. Due to the initial price λ  is too low, which 
leads the entities to be unwilling to participate in the game 
and the received services are low. In order to make the 
service reach to the expected value, improve the price λ  to 
stimulate the entity interaction with others.  
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Fig. 4  The price λ  can reach equilibrium state 
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Fig. 5 The ratio of cooperation   can reach equilibrium state  
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Fig. 6 The total game times, cooperation times, defect times 
in equilibrium state 
Fig. 5 reflects the case of the cooperation ratio in the 
evolution of game, where the cooperation ratio is rising 
until it reaches stable. In order to receive more services 
from entities, SOs constantly increases the service price λ  
to stimulate the entity interaction with others. When the 
service price λ  is increased, the entity is glad to play with 
others, so SOs can get more services, that is, the 
cooperation ratio is grown (Fig. 5). In Fig. 6, the times of 
game are declining with the evolution of game; the reason is 
that some entities died due to without any payoffs. Though 
some entities can increase the number of game, it is slowing 
and unobvious, the trend is declining (Fig. 6). 
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Fig. 7 the number of surviving entities for difference 
strategies (λ=50) 
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  Fig. 8 the number of surviving entities for difference 
strategies (λ=100)  
Fig. 7 reflects the case of the number of surviving 
entities for difference strategies when the price ζ  is 50. 
"0110" is the best strategy in the service price  ζ  is 50, 
which means the entity with "0110" can have more survival 
than others. Fig. 8 reflects the case of the number of 
surviving entities for difference strategies when the price ζ  
is 100. "0111" is the best strategy in the service price  ζ  is 
50, which means the entity with "0111" can have better 
survival than others. Comparing the results of above, we 
can obtain that the best strategy is different when the service 
price λ is different. 
Fig. 9 illustrates how the difference of the average 
unit price of entities between different strategies, but the 
average unit price is falling when the system reach 
stability at fast speed in the evolutionary game, as shown 
in Fig. 10. The main reason is that the service price ζ  of 
the entity is high when the entity receives a service, so 
the entity's average unit price is high; the entity must 
reduce the price in order to get higher payoffs during the 
evolution of system, so the entity gives little payments to 
the other entity which provides the service. The SOs 
gives higher payoffs to the entity, so the entity obtains 
high payoffs. Secondly, some entities died because of the 
little payoffs, which lead to the total entity unit price low.  
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Fig. 9 The average price of each species  
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Fig. 10  The average price of entity  
5.3. The network parameters effect on price 
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                Fig. 11  The number of surviving entities     
Fig. 11 shows the different evolution game speed 
have effect on the model. From the result of the 
experiment, when the evolution velocity is adopted as 
equation 8, In terms of the number of surviving entities, 
the larger the evolution velocity is, the less the number of 
surviving entities (Fig. 11)is. The reason is that the 
strategy with the competitive advantage will dominate 
the network at faster velocity when the evolution 
velocity is big, and the other disadvantaged strategies 
will die at faster velocity, which leads to fewer surviving 
entities (see from Fig. 11). Fig. 12 shows the different cost 
have effect on the model. It does not affect the speed of 
reach a stable state when using different payoffs (Fig. 12). 
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  Fig. 12 The total payment with difference cost q−   
5.4. The result of GPSD model  
Whether the number of entities involved in the game 
have influence on the proposed model is also an 
interesting topic. We investigate this issue through a 
series of experiments (Fig. 13 - Fig. 15). First, when the 
number of entities increases, the cooperation ratio for the 
system significantly decreased due to the increase of 
competition, but it is still higher than payments in the 
condition of insufficient payments (Fig. 13). Second, the 
number of cooperation games in the system, the total 
number of games will rise as the system increases the 
total number of entities (Fig. 14), and the number of 
defect games in the system grows faster, so as to make 
the system cooperation ratio decline. Third, the number 
of surviving entities will also grow with the growth of 
the total number of entities involved in the game at very 
great degree (Fig. 15). Fourth, the given price λ   has an 
obvious relationship with the number of entities; the 
more entities involved in the game is, the lower the price 
λ  is (Fig. 16); the more the total number of services is, 
the higher the price λ  is (Fig. 16). This shows that our 
model reflects the situation better. The average price of 
the entity has the same situation; the more entities 
involved in the game are, the lower the average price λ of 
the entity (Fig. 16) is, and the more the total number of 
services is, the higher the average price λ  of the entity 
is(Fig. 16). 
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Fig. 13 The ratio of cooperation in stability state under 
difference initial entities  
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Fig. 14 The times of game in stability state under difference 
initial entities 
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Fig. 15 The number of survival entities in stability state 
under difference initial entities 
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Fig. 16 the price λ  of SOs in stability state under difference 
initial entities 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this work, we study how to depict the price 
decision process between SOs and service entities, and 
among entities. A game based services price decision 
(GSPD) model is proposed to depict the phenomenon of 
price competition in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS).  We 
demonstrate that proposed model can better depict the 
process of price competition in CPS, especially the price 
competitive relationship among entities which is ignored 
in previous studies. Through a lots of experiments, it is 
found that the game model can reach rapidly to a stable 
state under the condition of any given parameters for the 
system, and entities with difference strategies have 
different optimal price, even the entity with same 
strategy have different optimal price when the system 
reach to stable. All of these are consistent with the looser 
price competition situation in the actual CPS, it explain 
that GSPD model can better reflect the diversity and 
complexity of this kind of price competition in the 
CPS .Through the model, we can predict in advance what 
price is optimization for SOs, the average payoffs for 
each entity, each entity's game times, and cooperation 
ratio for the system, which provide a good decision 
support for decision makers.   
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